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Abstract
Data privacy is an important issue for “ma-
chine learning as a service” providers. We
focus on the problem of membership infer-
ence attacks: given a data sample and black-
box access to a model’s API, determine
whether the sample existed in the model’s
training data. Our contribution is an in-
vestigation of this problem in the context
of sequence-to-sequence models, which are
important in applications such as machine
translation and video captioning. We define
the membership inference problem for se-
quence generation, provide an open dataset
based on state-of-the-art machine transla-
tion models, and report initial results on
whether these models leak private informa-
tion against several kinds of membership in-
ference attacks.
1 Motivation
There are many situations where private entities
are worried about the privacy of their data. For ex-
ample, many companies provide black-box train-
ing services where users are able to upload their
data and have customized models built for them,
without requiring machine learning expertise. A
common concern in these “machine learning as a
service” offerings is that the uploaded data be vis-
ible only to the client that owns it.
Currently, these entities are in the position of
having to trust that service providers abide by the
terms of their agreements. While trust is an impor-
tant component in relationships of all kinds, it has
its limitations. In particular, it falls short of a well
known security maxim, originating in a Russian
proverb that translates as, Trust, but verify.1 Ide-
ally, customers would be able to verify that their
∗ Work done while visiting Johns Hopkins University.
1Popularized by Ronald Reagan in the context of nuclear
disarmament.
Figure 1: Membership Inference Attack
private data was not being slurped up by the serv-
ing company, whether by design or accident.
This problem has been formalized as the mem-
bership inference problem, first introduced by
Shokri et al. (2017) and defined as: “Given a
machine learning model and a record, determine
whether this record was used as part of the model’s
training dataset or not.” The problem can be tack-
led in an adversarial framework: the attacker is in-
terested in answering this question with high accu-
racy, while the defender would like this question
to be unanswerable (see Figure 1). Since then,
researchers have proposed many ways to attack
and defend the privacy of various types of mod-
els. However, the work so far has only focused on
standard classification problems, where the output
space of the model is a fixed set of labels.
In this paper, we propose to investigate mem-
bership inference for sequence generation prob-
lems, where the output space can be viewed as
a chained sequence of classifications. Prime ex-
amples of sequence generation includes machine
translation and text summarization: in these prob-
lems, the output is a sequence of words whose
length is undetermined a priori. Other examples
include speech synthesis and video caption gen-
eration. Sequence generation problems are more
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complex than classification problems, and it is un-
clear whether the methods and results developed
for membership inference in classification prob-
lems will transfer. For example, one might imag-
ine that while a flat classification model might leak
private information when the output is a single la-
bel, a recurrent sequence generation model might
obfuscate this leakage when labels are generated
successively with complex dependencies.
We focus on machine translation (MT) as the
example sequence generation problem. Recent
advances in neural sequence-to-sequence models
have improved the quality of MT systems signifi-
cantly, and many commercial service providers are
deploying these models via public API’s. We pose
the main question in the following form:
Given black-box access to an MT model,
is it possible to determine whether a
particular sentence pair was in the
training set for that model?
In the following, we define membership infer-
ence for sequence generation problems (§2) and
contrast with prior work on classification (§3).
Next we present a novel dataset (§4) based on
state-of-the-art MT models.2 Finally, we propose
several attack methods (§5) and present a series
of experiments evaluating their ability to answer
the membership inference question (§6). Our con-
clusion is that simple one-off attacks based on
shadow models, which proved successful in classi-
fication problems, are not successful on sequence
generation problems; this is a result that favors
the defender. Nevertheless, we describe the spe-
cific conditions where sequence-to-sequence mod-
els still leak private information, and discuss the
possibility of more powerful attacks (§7).
2 Problem Definition
We now define the membership inference attack
problem for sequence-to-sequence models in de-
tail. Following tradition in the security research
literature, we introduce three characters:
Alice (the service provider) builds a sequence-
to-sequence model based on an undisclosed
datasetAtrain and provides a public API. For MT,
this API takes a foreign sentence f as input and
returns an English translation eˆ.
2We release the data to encourage further research in
this new problem: https://github.com/sorami/
tacl-membership
Bob (the attacker) is interested in discerning
whether a data sample was included in Alice’s
training data Atrain by exploiting Alice’s API.
This sample is called a “probe” and consists of a
foreign sentence f and its reference English trans-
lation, e. Together with the API’s output eˆ, Bob
has to make a binary decision using a membership
inference classifier g(·), whose goal is to predict:3
g(f, e, eˆ) =
{
in if probe ∈ Atrain
out otherwise
(1)
We term in-probes to be those probes where the
true class is in, and out-probes to be those whose
true class is out. Importantly, note that Bob has
access not only to f but also to e in the probe. Intu-
itively, if eˆ is equivalent to e, then Bob may believe
that the probe was contained in Atrain; however,
it may also be possible that Alice’s model general-
izes well to new samples and translates this probe
correctly. The challenge for Bob is to make this
distinction; the challenge for Alice is to prevent
Bob from doing so.
Carol (the neutral third-party) is in charge of
setting up the experiment between Alice and Bob.
She decides which data samples should be used
as in-probes and out-probes and evaluates Bob’s
classification accuracy. Carol is introduced only
to clarify the exposition and to setup a fair experi-
ment for research purposes. In practical scenarios,
Carol does not exist: Bob decides his own probes,
and Alice decides her own Atrain.
2.1 Detailed Specification
In order to be precise about how Carol sets up
the experiment, we will explain in terms of ma-
chine translation, but note that the problem defi-
nition applies to any sequence-to-sequence prob-
lem. A training set for MT consists of a set
of sentence pairs {(f (d)i ,e
(d)
i ) }. We use a la-
bel d ∈ {`1, `2, . . .} to indicate the domain (the
subcorpus or the data source), and an index i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , I(d)} to indicate the sample id in the
domain (subcorpus). For example, e(d)i with d =
`1 and i = 1 might refer to the first sentence in
the Europarl subcorpus, while e(d)i with d = `2
and i = 1 might refer to the first sentence in the
3In the experiments, we will also consider extending the
information available to Bob. For example, if Alice addition-
ally provides the translation probabilities ρ in the API, then
Bob can exploit that in the classifier as g(f, e, eˆ, ρ).
CommonCrawl subcorpus. I(d) is the maximum
number of sentences in the subcorpus with label
d. The distinction among subcorpora is not neces-
sary in the abstract problem definition, but is im-
portant in practice when differences in data distri-
bution may reveal signals in membership.
Without loss of generality, in this section as-
sume that Carol has a finite number of samples
from two subcorpora d ∈ {`1, `2}. First, she cre-
ates an out-probe of k samples from subcorpus `1:
Aout_probe =
{
(f
(d)
i , e
(d)
i ) :
d = `1, `2
i = 1, . . . , k
}
(2)
Then Carol creates the data for Alice to train
Alice’s MT model, using subcorpora `1 and `2:
Atrain =
{
(f
(d)
i , e
(d)
i ) :
d = `1, `2
i = k + 1, . . . , I(d)
}
(3)
Importantly, the two sets are totally disjoint:
i.e. Aout_probe ∩ Atrain = ∅. By definition,
out-probes are sentence pairs that are not in Al-
ice’s training data. Finally, Carol creates the
in-probe of k samples by drawing from Atrain,
i.e. Ain_probe ⊂ Atrain, which is defined to be
samples that are included in training:
Ain_probe =
{
(f
(d)
i , e
(d)
i ) :
d = `1, `2
i = k + 1, . . . , 2k
}
(4)
Note that bothAin_probe andAout_probe are sen-
tence pairs that come from the same subcorpus;
the only difference is that the former is included in
Atrain while the latter is not.
There are several ways in which Bob’s data can
be created. For this work, we will assume that Bob
also has some data to train MT models, in order
to mimic Alice and design his attacks. This data
could either be disjoint from Atrain, or contain
parts of Atrain. We choose the latter, which as-
sumes that there might be some public data that
is accessible to both Alice and Bob. This sce-
nario slightly favors Bob. In the case of MT, par-
allel data can be hard to come by, and datasets
like Europarl are widely accessible to anyone,
so presumably both Alice and Bob would use
it. However, we expect that Alice has in-house
dataset (e.g., crawled data) which Bob does not
have access to. Thus, Carol creates data for Bob:
Ball =
{
(f
(d)
i , e
(d)
i ) :
d = `1
i = 2k + 1, . . . , I(d)
}
(5)
Note that this dataset is like Atrain but with
two exceptions: all samples from subcorpora `2
and all samples fromAin_probe are discarded. One
can view `2 as Alice’s own in-house corpus which
Bob has no knowledge of or access to, and `1 as
the shared corpus where membership inference at-
tacks are performed.
To summarize, Carol givesAtrain to Alice, who
uses it in whatever way she chooses to build a
sequence-to-sequence model M [Atrain,Θ]. The
model is trained on Atrain with hyperparameters
Θ (e.g., neural network architecture) known only
to Alice. In parallel, Carol gives Ball to Bob, who
uses it to design various attack strategies, result-
ing in a classifier g(·) (see Section 5). When it
is time for evaluation, Carol provides both probes
Ain_probe andAout_probe to Bob in randomized or-
der and asks Bob to classify each sample as in or
out. For each probe (f (d)i ,e
(d)
i ), Bob is allowed to
make one call to Alice’s API to obtain eˆ(d)i .
As an additional evaluation, Carol creates a
third probe based on a new subcorpus `3. We call
this the “out-of-domain (OOD) probe”:
Aood =
{
(f
(d)
i , e
(d)
i ) :
d = `3
i = 1, . . . , k
}
(6)
Both Aout_probe and Aood should be classified
as out by Bob’s classifier. However, it has been
known that sequence-to-sequence models behave
very differently on data from domains/genre that
is significantly different from the training data
(Koehn and Knowles, 2017). The goal of having
two out probes is to quantify the difficulty or ease
of membership inference in different situations.
2.2 Summary and Alternative Definitions
Figure 2 summarizes the problem definition. The
probes Aout_probe and Aood are by construction
outside of Alice’s training data Atrain, while the
probe Ain_probe is included. Bob’s goal is to pro-
duce a classifier that can make this distinction. He
has at his disposal a smaller dataset Ball, which he
can use in whatever way he desires.
Figure 2: Illustration of data splits for Alice and
Bob. There are k samples each for Ain_probe,
Aout_probe, and Aood. Alice’s training data Atrain ex-
cludes Aout_probe and `3, while including Ain_probe.
Bob’s data Ball is a subset of Alice’s data, excluding
Ain_probe and `2.
There are alternative definitions of this mem-
bership inference problem. For example, one can
allow Bob to make multiple API calls to Alice’s
model for each probe. This enlarges the reposi-
tory of potential attack strategies for Bob. Or, one
could evaluate Bob’s accuracy not on a per-sample
basis, but allow for a coarser granularity where
Bob can aggregate inferences over multiple sam-
ples. There is also a distinction between white-box
and black-box attacks: we focus on the black-box
case where Bob has no internal access to the in-
ternal parameters of Alice’s model, but can only
guess at likely model architectures. In the white-
box case, Bob would have access to Alice’s model
internals, so different attacks would be possible
(e.g., backpropagation of gradients). In these re-
spects, our problem definition makes the problem
more challenging for Bob the attacker.
Finally, note that Bob is not necessarily always
the “bad guy”. Some examples of who Alice and
Bob might be in MT are: (1) Organizations (Bob)
that provide bitext data under license restrictions
might be interested to determine whether their li-
censes are being complied with in published mod-
els (Alice). (2) The organizers (Bob) of an an-
nual bakeoff, e.g. WMT, might wish to confirm
that the participants (Alice) are following the rules
of not training on test data. (3) “MT as a service”
providers may support customized engines if users
upload their own bitext training data. The provider
promises that the user-supplied data will not be
used in the customized engines of other users, and
can play both Alice and Bob, attacking its own
model to provide guarantees to the user. If it is
possible to construct a successful membership in-
ference mechanism, then many “good guy” would
be able to provide the aforementioned fairness (1,
2) and privacy guarantees (3).
3 Related Work
Shokri et al. (2017) introduced the problem of
membership inference attacks on machine learn-
ing models. They showed that with shadow mod-
els trained on either realistic or synthetic datasets,
Bob can build classifiers that can discriminate
Ain_probe andAout_probe with high accuracy. They
focus on classification problems such as CIFAR
image recognition and demonstrate successful at-
tacks on both convolutional neural net models as
well as the models provided by Amazon ML.
Why do these attacks work? The main informa-
tion exploited by Bob’s classifier is the output dis-
tribution of class labels returned by Alice’s API.
The prediction uncertainty differs for data samples
inside and outside the model training data, and this
can be exploited. Shokri et al. (2017) proposes de-
fense strategies for Alice, such as restricting the
prediction vector to top-k classes, coarsening the
values of the output probabilities, and increasing
the entropy of the prediction vector. The crucial
difference between their work and ours, besides
our focus on sequence generation problems, is the
availability of this kind of output distribution pro-
vided by Alice. While it is common to provide the
whole distribution of output probabilities in classi-
fication problems, this is not possible in sequence
generation problems because the output space of
sequences is exponential in the output length. At
most, sequence models can provide a score for the
output prediction eˆ(d)i , for example with a beam
search procedure, but this is only one number and
not normalized. We do experiment with having
Bob exploit this score (Table 3), but it appears far
inferior to the use of the whole distribution avail-
able in classification problems.
Subsequent work on membership inference has
focused on different angles of the problem. Salem
et al. (2018) investigated the effect of training the
shadow model and datasets that match or does
not match the distribution of Atrain, and com-
pared training a single shadow model as opposed
to many. Truex et al. (2018) presents a comprehen-
sive evaluation of different model types, training
data, and attack strategies; Borrowing ideas from
adversarial learning and minimax games, Hayes
et al. (2017) proposes attack methods based on
generative adversarial networks, while Nasr et al.
(2018) provides adversarial regularization tech-
niques for the defender. Nasr et al. (2019) extends
the analysis to white-box attacks and a federated
learning setting. Pyrgelis et al. (2018) provides
an empirical study on location data. Veale et al.
(2018) discusses membership inference and the re-
lated model inversion problem, in the context of
data protection laws like GDPR.
Shokri et al. (2017) notes a synergistic connec-
tion between the goals of learning and the goals of
privacy in the case of membership inference: the
goal of learning is to generalize to data outside the
training set (e.g., so that Aout_probe and Aood are
translated well), while the goal of privacy is to pre-
vent leaking information about data in the training
set. The common enemy of both goals is over-
fitting. Yeom et al. (2017) analyze how overfitting
by Alice’s increases the risk privacy leakage; Long
et al. (2018) showed that even a well-generalized
model holds such risks in classification problems,
implying that overfitting by Alice is a sufficient but
not necessary condition for privacy leakage.
A large body of work exists in differential pri-
vacy (Dwork, 2008; Machanavajjhala et al., 2017).
Differential privacy provides guarantees that a
model trained on some dataset Atrain will pro-
duce statistically similar predictions as a model
trained on another dataset which differs in ex-
actly one sample. This is one way in which Alice
can defend her model (Rahman et al., 2018), but
note that differential privacy is a stronger notion
and often involves a cost in Alice’s model accu-
racy. Membership inference assumes that content
of the data is known to Bob and only is concerned
whether it was used. Differential privacy also pro-
tects the content of the data (i.e., the actual words
in (f (d)i ,e
(d)
i ) should not be inferred).
Song and Shmatikov (2019) explored the mem-
bership inference problem of natural language
text, including word prediction and dialog genera-
tion. They assume that the attacker has access to a
probability distribution or a sequence of distribu-
tions over the vocabulary for the generated word or
sequence. This is different from our work where
the attacker gets only the output sequence, which
we believe is a more realistic setting.
4 Data and Evaluation Protocol
4.1 Data: subcorpora and splits
Based on the problem definition in Section 2, we
construct a dataset to investigate the possibility of
the membership inference attack on MT models.
We make this dataset available to the public to en-
courage further research.4
There are various considerations to ensure the
benchmark is fair for both Alice and Bob: we need
a dataset that is large and diverse to ensure Alice
can train state-of-the-art MT models and Bob can
test on probes from different domains. We used
corpora from the Conference on Machine Trans-
lation (WMT18) (Bojar et al., 2018). We chose
German–English language pair because it has a
reasonably large amount of training data, and pre-
vious work demonstrate high BLEU scores.
We now describe how Carol prepares the
data for Alice and Bob. First, Carol se-
lects 4 subcorpora for the training data of Al-
ice, namely CommonCrawl, Europarl v7,
News Commentary v13, and Rapid 2016.
A subset of these 4 subcorpora are also available
to Bob (`1 in section 2.1). In addition, Carol gives
ParaCrawl to Alice but not Bob (`2 in §2.1).
We can think of it as an in-house data the service
provider holds. For all these subcorpora, Carol
first performs basic preprocessing: (a) tokeniza-
tion of both the German and English sides using
the Moses tokenizer, (b) de-duplication of sen-
tence pairs so that only unique pairs are present,
and (c) randomly shuffling all sentences prior to
splitting into probes and MT training data.5
Figure 3 illustrates how Carol splits subcor-
pora for Alice and Bob. For each subcorpus,
Carol splits them to create probes Ain_probe and
Aout_probe, and Atrain and Ball. Carol sets k =
5, 000, meaning each probe set per subcorpus has
5,000 samples. For each subcorpus, Carol se-
lects 5,000 samples to create Aout_probe. She
then uses the rest as Atrain and select 5,000
from it as Ain_probe. She excludes Ain_probe and
4https://github.com/sorami/
tacl-membership
5These are design decisions that balance between simple
experimentation vs. realistic condition. Carol doing a com-
mon tokenization removes some of the MT-specific complex-
ity for researchers who want to focus on the Alice or Bob
models. However, in a real-world public API, Alice’s tok-
enization is likely to be unknown to Bob. We decided on a
middle ground to have Carol perform a common tokeniza-
tion, but Alice and Bob do their own subword segmentation.
Aout_probe Ain_probe Atrain Ball Aood
ParaCrawl 5,000 5,000 4,518,029 0 N/A
CommonCrawl 5,000 5,000 2,389,123 2,379,123 N/A
Europarl 5,000 5,000 1,865,271 1,855,271 N/A
News 5,000 5,000 273,702 263,702 N/A
Rapid 5,000 5,000 1,062,214 1,052,214 N/A
EMEA N/A N/A N/A N/A 5,000
Koran N/A N/A N/A N/A 5,000
Subtitles N/A N/A N/A N/A 5,000
TED N/A N/A N/A N/A 5,000
TOTAL 25,000 25,000 10,108,339 5,550,310 20,000
Table 1: Number of sentences per set and subcorpus. For each subcorpus, Atrain includes Ain_probe and does not
include Aout_probe. Ball is a subset of Atrain, excluding Ain_probe and ParaCrawl. Aood is for evaluation only,
and only Carol has access to them.
Figure 3: Illustration of actual MT data splits. Atrain
does not contain Aout_probe, and Ball is a subset of
Atrain with Ain_probe and ParaCrawl excluded.
ParaCrawl from Atrain to create a dataset for
Bob, Ball.6 In addition, Carol has 4 other domains
to create out-of-domain probe set Aood, namely,
EMEA and Subtitles 18 (Tiedemann, 2012),
Koran (Tanzil), and TED (Duh, 2018). These
subcorpora are equivalent to `3 in section 2.1.
The size of Aood is 5,000 per subcorpus, same as
Ain_probe and Aout_probe. The number of samples
for each set is summarized in Table 1.
4.2 Alice MT Architecture
Alice uses her dataset Atrain (consisting of 4 sub-
corpora and ParaCrawl) to train her own MT
model. Since Paracrawl is noisy, Alice first
applied dual conditional cross-entropy filtering
(Junczys-Dowmunt, 2018), retaining the top 4.5
million lines. Alice then trained a joint BPE sub-
6We prepared two different pairs of Ain_probe and
Aout_probe. Thus Ball has 10k less samples thanAtrain, and
not 5k less. For the experiment we used only one pair, and
kept the other for future use.
word model (Sennrich et al., 2016) using 32,000
merge operations. No recasing was applied.
Alice’s model is a six-layer Transformer
(Vaswani et al., 2017) using default parameters in
Sockeye (Hieber et al., 2017).7 The model was
trained until perplexity on newstest2017 (Bo-
jar et al., 2017) had not improved for five consec-
utive checkpoints, computed every 5,000 batches.
The BLEU score (Papineni et al., 2002) on
newstest2018 was 42.6, computed using
sacreBLEU (Post, 2018) with the default settings.8
4.3 Evaluation Protocol
To evaluate membership inference attacks on Al-
ice’s MT models, we use the following procedure:
First, Bob asks Alice to translate f . Alice returns
her result eˆ to Bob. Bob also has access to the
reference e and use his classifier g(f, e, eˆ) to infer
whether (e, f) was in Alice’s training data. The
classification is reported to Carol, who computes
“attack accuracy”. Given a probe set P containing
a list of (f, e, eˆ, l), where l is the label (in or out),
this accuracy is defined as:
accuracy(g, P ) =
1
|P |
P∑
[g(f, e, eˆ) = l] (7)
If the accuracy is 50%, then the binary classifi-
cation is same as random, and Alice is safe. An
7Three-way tied embeddings, model and embedding size
512, eight attention heads, 2,048 hidden states in the feed
forward layers, layer normalization applied before each self-
attention layer, and dropout and residual connections applied
afterward, word-based batch size of 4,096.
8Version 1.2.12, case-sensitive, “13a” tokenization for
comparability with WMT.
accuracy slightly above 50% can be considered a
potential breach of privacy.
5 Membership Inference Attacks
5.1 Shadow Model Framework
Bob’s initial approach for attack is to use “shadow
models”, similar to Shokri et al. (2017). The
idea is that Bob creates MT models with his data
to mimic (shadow) the behavior of Alice’s MT
model, then train a membership inference classi-
fier on these shadow models. To do so, Bob splits
his data Ball into his own version of in-probe, out-
probe, and training set in multiple ways to train
MT models. Then he translates these probe sen-
tences with his own shadow MT models, and use
the resulting (f, e, eˆ) with its in or out label to
train a binary classifier g(f, e, eˆ). If Bob’s shadow
models are sufficiently similar to Alice’s in behav-
ior, this attack can work.
Bob first selects 10 sets of 5,000 sentences per
subcorpus in Ball. He then chooses 2 sets and
use one as in-probe and the other as out-probe,
and combine in-probe and the rest (Ball minus 10
sets) as a training set. We use notations B1+in_probe
B1+out_probe, and B1+train for the first group of in-
probe, out-probe, and training set. Bob then
swaps the in-probe and out-probe to create another
group. We notate this as B1−in_probe, B1−out_probe, and
B1−train. With 10 sets of 5,000 sentences, Bob can
create 10 different groups of in-probe, out-probe,
and training set. Figure 4 illustrates the data splits.
Figure 4: Illustration of how Bob splits Ball for each
shadow model. Blue boxes are the in-probe Bin_probe
and training data Btrain, where small box is the in-
probe and small and large boxes combined is the train-
ing data. Green box indicates the out-probe Bout_probe.
Bob uses models from splits 1 to 3 as a train, 4 as a
validation, and 5 as a test sets for his attack.
For each group of data, Bob first trains a shadow
MT model using the training set. He then uses this
model to translate sentences in the in-probe and
out-probe sets. Bob has now a list of (f, e, eˆ) from
different shadow models, and he knows for each
sample if it was in or out of the training data for
the MT model used to translate that sentence.
5.2 Bob MT Architecture
Bob’s model is a 4-layer Transformer, with no tied
embedding, model/embedding size 512, 8 atten-
tion heads, 1,024 hidden states in the feed forward
layers, word-based batch size of 4,096. The model
is optimized with Adam (Kingma and Ba, 2015),
regularized with label smoothing (0.1), and trained
until perplexity on newstest2016 (Bojar et al.,
2016) had not improved for sixteen consecutive
checkpoints, computed every 4,000 batches. Bob
has BPE subword models with vocab size 30k for
each language. The mean BLEU scores of the ten
shadow models on newstest2018 is 38.6±0.2
(compared to 42.6 for Alice).
5.3 Membership Inference Classifier
Bob extracts features from (f, e, eˆ) for a binary
classifier. He uses modified 1-4 gram precisions
and smoothed sentence-level BLEU score (Lin
and Och, 2004) as features. Bob’s intuition is
that if an unusually large number of n-grams in
eˆ matches e, then it could be a sign that this was in
the training data and Alice memorized it. Bob cal-
culates n-gram precision by counting the number
of n-grams in translation that appear in the refer-
ence sentence. In the later investigation Bob also
considered the MT model score as an extra feature.
Bob tried different types of classifiers, namely
namely Perceptron (P), Decision Tree (DT), Naïve
Bayes (NB), Nearest Neighbors (NN), and Multi-
layer Perceptron (MLP). DT uses GINI impurity
for the splitting metrics, and the max depth to be
5. Our NB uses Gaussian distribution. For NN
we set the number of neighbors to be 5 and used
Minkowski distance. For MLP, we set the size of
hidden layer to be 100, activation function to be
ReLU, and L2 regularization term α to be 0.0001.
Pseudocode 1 summarizes the procedure to con-
struct a membership inference classifier g(·) using
Bob’s dataset Ball. For training the binary classi-
fiers, Bob uses models from data splits 1 to 3 for
training, 4 for validation, and 5 for his own inter-
nal testing. Note that the final evaluation of the
attack is done using the translations of Ain_probe
and Aout_probe with Alice MT model, by Carol.
Algorithm 1: Construction of A Membership
Inference Classifier
Data: Ball
Result: g(·)
Split Ball into multiples groups of (Biin_probe,
Biout_probe, Bitrain) ;
foreach i in 1+, 1−, 2+, 2−, 3+, 3− do
Train a shadow model Mi using Bitrain ;
Translate Biin_probe, Biout_probe with Mi ;
end
Use Biin_probe, Biout_probe, and their
translations to train g(·) ;
6 Attack Results
We now present a series of results based on the
shadow model attack method described in Sec-
tion 5. In Section 6.1 we will observe that Bob has
difficulty attacking Alice under our definition of
membership inference. In Sections 6.2 and 6.3 we
will see that Alice nevertheless does leak some pri-
vate information under more nuanced conditions.
Section 6.4 describes the possibility of attacks be-
yond sentence-level membership. Section 6.5 ex-
plore the attacks using external resources.
6.1 Main Result
Alice Bob:train Bob:valid Bob:test
P 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
DT 50.4 51.4 51.2 51.1
NB 50.4 51.2 51.1 51.0
NN 49.9 61.6 50.5 50.0
MLP 50.2 50.8 50.8 50.8
Table 2: Accuracy of membership inference per clas-
sifier type, Perceptron (P), Decision Tree (DT), Naïve
Bayes (NB), Nearest Neighbors (NN), and Multi-layer
Perceptron (MLP). Alice column shows the accuracy of
attack on Alice probes Ain_probe and Aout_probe. Bob
columns show the accuracy on the classifiers’ train, val-
idation, and test set. Note that, following the evaluation
protocol explained in 4.3, only Carol the evaluator can
observe the accuracy of the attacks on Alice model.
Table 2 shows the accuracy of the membership
inference classifiers. There are 5 different types of
classifiers, as described in section 5.3. The num-
bers in the Alice column shows the attack accuracy
on Alice probes Ain_probe and Aout_probe; these
are the main results. The numbers in Bob columns
show the results on the Bob classifiers’ train, vali-
dation, and test sets, as described in Section 5.3.
The results of the attacks on the Alice model
show that it is around 50%, meaning that the at-
tack is not successful and the binary classification
is almost the same as a random choice. 9 The
accuracy is around 50% for Bob:valid, meaning
that Bob also has difficulty attacking his own sim-
ulated probes, therefore the poor performance on
Ain_probe and Aout_probe is not due to mismatches
between Alice’s model and Bob’s model.
The accuracy is around 50% for Bob:train as
well, reveals that the classifier g(·) is underfit-
ting.10 This suggests that the current features do
not provide enough information to distinguish in-
probe and out-probe sentences. Figure 5 shows the
confusion matrices of the classifier output on Al-
ice probes. We see that for all classifiers, whatever
prediction they make is incorrect half of the time.
Alice Bob:train Bob:valid Bob:test
P 49.7 49.2 49.3 49.4
DT 50.4 51.5 51.1 51.2
NB 50.1 50.2 50.1 50.2
NN 50.2 67.1 50.2 50.0
MLP 50.4 51.2 51.2 51.1
Table 3: Membership inference accuracy when MT
model score is added as an extra classifier feature.
Table 3 shows the result when MT model score
is added as an extra feature for classification. The
result indicates that this extra information does
not improve the attack accuracy. In summary,
these results suggest that Bob is not able to reveal
membership information at the sentence/sample
level. This result is in contrast to previous work
on membership inference in “classification” prob-
lems, which demonstrated high accuracy with
Bob’s shadow model attack.
Additionally, note that while accuracies are
close to 50%, the number of Bob:test tend to be
9Some numbers are slightly over 50% which may be in-
terpreted as small leak of privacy. While the desired accu-
racy levels depend on the application, for the MT scenarios
described in Section 2.2 Bob would need much higher accu-
racies. For example, if Bob is a bakeoff organizer, he might
want accuracy above 60% in order to determine whether to
manually check the submission. However, if Bob is provid-
ing “MT as a service” with strong privacy guarantees, he may
need to provide the client with accuracy higher than 90%.
10The higher accuracy for k-NN is an exception, but is due
to having the exact same datapoint in the model as the in-
put, which always becomes the nearest neighbor. When the k
value is increased, the accuracy on in-sample data decreased.
Figure 5: Confusion matrices of the attacks on Alice model per classifier type.
slightly higher than Alice’s for some classifiers.
This may reflect the fact that Bob:test is a matched
condition using the same shadow MT architecture,
while Alice probes are from a mismatched con-
dition using an unknown MT architecture. It is
important to compare both numbers in the experi-
ments: accuracy on Alice probes is the real evalu-
ation and accuracy on Bob:test is a diagnostic.
6.2 Out-of-Domain Subcorpora
Carol prepared out-of-domain (OOD) subcorpora,
Aood, that are separate from Atrain and Ball. The
membership inference accuracy of each subcor-
pus is shown in Table 4. The accuracy for OOD
subcorpora are much higher than that of original
in-domain subcorpora. For example, the accu-
racy with Decision Tree was 50.3% and 51.1% for
ParaCrawl and CommonCrawl (in-domain),
whereas 67.2% and 94.1% for EMEA and Koran
(out-of-domain). This suggests that for OOD data
Bob has a better chance to infer the membership.
In Table 4 we can see that Perceptron has accu-
racy 50% for all in-domain subcorpora and 100%
for all OOD subcorpora. Note that the OOD sub-
corpora only have out-probes; By definition none
of the samples from OOD subcorpora are in the
training data. We get such accuracy because our
Perceptron is always predicting out, as we can see
in Figure 5. We believe this behavior is caused by
applying Perceptron to inseparable data, and this
particular model happened to be trained to act this
way. To confirm this we have trained variations of
Perceptrons by shuffling the training data, and ob-
served that the resulting models had different out-
put ratio of in and out, and in some cases always
predicting in for both in and OOD subcorpora.
Figure 6 shows the distribution of sentence-
level BLEU scores per subcorpus. The BLEU
scores tends to be lower for OOD subcorpora,
and the classifier may exploit this information to
distinguish the membership better. But note that
EMEA (out-of-domain) and CommonCrawl (in-
domain) have similar BLEU, but vastly different
membership accuracies, so the classifier may also
be exploiting n-gram match distributions.
Overall, these results suggest that Bob’s accu-
racy depends on the specific type of probe being
tested. If there is a wide distribution of domains,
there is a higher chance that Bob may be able to
reveal membership information. Note that in the
actual scenario Bob will have no way of knowing
what is OOD for Alice, so there is no signal that
is exploitable for Bob. This section is meant as
an error analysis that describes how membership
inference classifiers behave differently in case the
probe is OOD.
6.3 Out-of-Vocabulary Words
We also focused on the samples which contain
the words that never appear in the training data
of the MT model used for translation, i.e., out-of-
vocabulary (OOV) words. For this analysis, we
focus only on vocabulary that does not exist in the
training data of Bob’s shadow MT models, rather
than Alice’s, since Bob does not have access to
her vocabulary. By definition there are only out-
probes in OOV subsets.
For Bob’s shadow models, 7.4%, 3.2%, and
1.9% of samples in the probe sets had one or
more OOV words in source, reference, or both
sentences, respectively. Table 5 shows the mem-
bership inference accuracy of the OOV subsets
from Bob test set, which is generally very high
(>70%). This implies that sentences with OOV
words are translated idiosyncratically compared to
the ones without OOV words, and classifier can
exploit this.
6.4 Alternative Evaluation: Grouping Probes
Section 6.1 showed it is generally difficult for Bob
to determine membership for the strict definition
of one sentence per probe. What if we loosen the
problem, letting the probe be a group of sentences?
We create probes of 500 sentences each to in-
ParaCrawl CommonCrawl Europarl News Rapid EMEA Koran Subtitles TED
P 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
DT 50.3 51.1 49.7 50.7 50.0 67.2 94.1 80.2 67.1
NB 50.1 51.2 49.9 50.6 50.2 69.5 96.1 81.7 70.5
NN 49.4 50.7 50.3 49.7 49.2 43.3 52.6 48.7 49.9
MLP 49.6 50.8 49.9 50.3 50.7 73.6 97.9 84.8 85.0
Table 4: Membership inference accuracy per subcorpus. Right 4 columns are results for out-of-domain subcorpora.
Note that ParaCrawl is out-of-domain for Bob and his classifier, whereas in-domain for Alice and her MT model.
Figure 6: Distribution of sentence-level BLEU per subcorpora for Ain_probe (blue boxes), Aout_probe (green, left
five boxes), and Aood (green, right four boxes).
OOV in src OOV in ref OOV in both
P 100.0 100.0 100.0
DT 73.9 74.1 68.0
NB 77.4 77.0 70.3
NN 49.9 49.2 49.3
MLP 89.0 85.8 80.4
Table 5: Membership inference accuracy on the
sentences in Bob:test containing Out-of-vocabulary
(OOV) words for the MT model used for translation.
vestigate this hypothesis. Bob randomly samples
500 sentences with the same label from Bob’s
training set to form a probe group. To create suf-
ficient training data for his classifier, Bob repeats
sampling and creates 6,000 groups. Bob uses sen-
tence BLEU bin percentage, and corpus BLEU as
features for classification. For each group, Bob
counts the sentence BLEU for each bin. The bin
size is set to 0.01. Bob also uses all 500 transla-
tion together to calculate the group’s corpus BLEU
score. Bob trains the classifiers using these fea-
tures, and apply it to Bob’s validation and test set,
and Alice set. These sets are evenly split into
groups of 500, not sampled as done in training.
Table 6 shows the accuracy on probe groups.
We can see that the accuracy is much higher than
50%, not only for Bob’s training set but also for
his validation and test sets. However, for Alice, we
found that classifiers were almost always predict-
Bob Alice
train valid test original adjusted
P 71.6 69.4 68.1 50.0 59.0
DT 70.4 65.6 64.4 52.0 61.0
NB 72.9 67.5 70.0 50.0 50.0
NN 77.4 66.9 62.5 51.0 50.0
MLP 73.0 68.8 70.0 50.0 52.0
Table 6: Attack accuracy on probe groups. In addition
to the original Alice set, we have adjusted set where
the feature values are adjusted by subtracting the mean
BLEU difference between Alice and Bob models.
ing in, resulting the accuracy to be around 50%.
This is due to the fact that classifiers were trained
on shadow models that have lower BLEU scores
than Alice. This suggests that we need to incor-
porate the information about the Alice / Bob MT
performance difference.
One way to adjust the difference is to directly
manipulate the input feature values. We adjusted
the feature values, compensating by the differ-
ence in mean BLEU scores, and accuracy on Alice
probes increased to 60% for P and DT as shown
in the “adjusted” column of Table 6. If the clas-
sifier took advantage of the absolute values in its
decision, the adjustment may give improvements.
If that is not the case, then improvements are less
likely. Before the adjustment, all classifiers were
predicting everything to be in for Alice probes.
Classifiers like NB and MLP apparently did not
Figure 7: How the attack accuracy on Alice set changes
when probe groups are sorted by Perceptron output
score and the threshold to classify them as in is varied.
change how often it predicts in even after the nor-
malization, whereas classifiers like P and DT did.
In a real scenario this BLEU difference can be rea-
sonably estimated by Bob, since he can use Alice’s
translation API to calculate BLEU score on a held-
out set, and compare it with his shadow models.
Another possible approach to handle the prob-
lem of classifiers always predicting in is to con-
sider the relative size of classifier output score.
We can rank the samples by the classifier output
scores, and decide top N% to be in and rest to be
out. Figure 7 shows how the accuracy changes
when varying the in percentage. We can see that
the accuracy can be much higher than the origi-
nal result, especially if Bob can adjust the thresh-
old based on his knowledge of in percentage in the
probe.
This is the first strong general result for Bob,
suggesting the membership inference attacks are
possible if probes are defined as groups of sen-
tences.11 Importantly, note that the classifier
threshold adjustment is performed only for the
classifiers in this section, and is not relevant for
the classifiers in Section 6.1 to 6.3.
6.5 Attacks using External Resources
Our results in Section 6.1 demonstrate the dif-
ficulty of general membership inference attacks.
One natural question is whether attacks can be im-
proved with even stronger features or classifiers, in
particular by exploiting external resources beyond
the dataset Carol provided to Bob. We tried two
different approaches: one using a Quality Estima-
tion model trained on additional data, and another
using a neural sequence model with a pre-trained
11We can imagine an alternative definition of this group-
level membership inference where Bob’s goal is to predict
the percentage of overlap with respect to Alice’s training data.
This assumes that model trainers make corpus-level decisions
about what data to train on. Reformulation of a binary prob-
lem to a regression problem may be useful for some purposes.
language model.
Quality Estimation (QE) is a task of predicting
the quality of a translation at the sentence or word
level. One may imagine that a QE model might
produce useful feature to tease apart in and out
because in translations may have detectable im-
provements in quality. To train this model, we
used the external dataset from the WMT shared
task on QE (Specia et al., 2018). Note that for
our language pair, German to English, the shared
task only had labeled dataset for SMT system.
Our models are NMT, so the estimation qual-
ity may not be optimally matched, but we be-
lieve this is the best data available at this time.
We applied the Predictor-Estimator (Kim et al.,
2017) implemented in an open source QE frame-
work OpenKiwi (Kepler et al., 2019). It con-
sists of predictor that predicts each token of the
target sentence given the target context and the
source, and estimator that takes features produced
by the predictor to estimate the labels; Both are
made of LSTMs. We employed this model as
this is one of the best models seen in the shared
tasks, and it does not require alignment informa-
tion. The model metrics on the WMT18 dev set,
namely Pearson’s correlation, Mean Average Er-
ror and Root Mean Squared Error for sentence-
level scores are 0.6238, 0.1276, and 0.1745 re-
spectively.
We used the sentence score estimated by the QE
model as an extra feature for classifiers described
in Section 6.1. The results are shown in Table 7.
We can see that this extra feature did not give any
significant influence to the accuracy. In a more de-
tailed analysis, we find that the reason is that our
in and out probes both contain a range of transla-
tions from low to high quality translations, and our
QE model may not be sufficiently fine-grained to
tease apart any potential differences. In fact, this
may be difficult even for a human estimator.
Another approach to exploit external resources
is to use language model pre-trained on a large
amount of text. In particular, we used BERT (De-
vlin et al., 2019) which has shown competitive re-
sults in many NLP tasks. We used BERT directly
as a classifier, and followed a fine-tuning setup
similar to paraphrase detection: for our case the
inputs are the English translation and reference
sentences, and the output is the binary member-
ship label. This setup is similar to the classifiers
we described in Section 5.3, where rather than
training Perceptron or Decision Tree on manually-
defined features, we directly applied BERT-based
sequence encoders on the raw sentences.
We fine-tuned the BERT Base,Cased En-
glish model with Bob:train. The results are shown
in Table 7. Similar to previous results, the accu-
racy is 50% so the attack using BERT as classifier
was not successful. Detailed examination of the
BERT classifier probabilities show that they are
scattered around 0.5 for all cases, but in general
quite random for both Bob and Alice probes. This
result is similar to the other simpler classifiers in
Section 6.1.
Alice Bob:train Bob:valid Bob:test
P 50.0 49.9 50.0 50.0
DT 50.3 51.4 51.1 51.1
NB 50.4 51.2 51.1 51.0
NN 49.8 66.1 50.0 50.1
MLP 50.4 51.0 51.0 50.8
BERT 50.0 50.0 50.0 50.0
Table 7: Membership inference accuracies for classi-
fiers with Quality Estimation sentence score as an extra
feature, and a BERT classifier.
In summary, from above results we can see that
even with external resources and more complex
classifiers, sentence-level attack is still very diffi-
cult for Bob. We believe this attests to the inherent
difficulty of the sentence-level membership infer-
ence problem.
7 Discussions and Conclusions
We formalized the problem of membership infer-
ence attacks on sequence generation tasks, and
used Machine Translation as an example to inves-
tigate the feasibility of a privacy attack.
Our results in Section 6.1 and Section 6.5 show
that Alice is generally safe and it is difficult for
Bob to infer the sentence-level membership. In
contrast to attacks on standard classification prob-
lems (Shokri et al., 2017), sequence generation
problems maybe be harder to attack because the
input and output spaces are far larger and com-
plex, making it difficult to determine the quality
of the model output or how confident the model is.
Also, the output distribution of class labels is an
effective feature for the attacker for standard clas-
sification problems, but is difficult to exploit in the
sequence case.
However, this does not mean that Alice has no
risk of leaking private information. Our analy-
ses in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 show that Bob’s accu-
racy on out-of-domain and out-of-vocabulary data
is above chance, suggesting that attacks may be
feasible in conditions where unseen words and do-
mains cause the model to behave differently. Fur-
ther, Section 6.4 shows that for a looser definition
of membership attack on groups of sentences, the
attacker can win at a level above chance.
Our attack approach was a simple one, using
shadow models to mimic the target model. Bob
can attempt more complex strategies, for exam-
ple, by using the translation API multiple times
per sentence. Bob can manipulate a sentence, for
example, by dropping or adding words, and ob-
serve how the translation changes. We may also
use the metrics proposed by Carlini et al. (2018) as
features for Bob; they show how recurrent models
might unintentionally memorize rare sequences in
the training data, and proposed a method to detect
it. Bob can also add “watermark sentences” that
have some distinguishable characteristics to influ-
ence the Alice model, making attack easier. To
guard against these attack, Alice protection strat-
egy may include random subsampling of training
data or additional regularization terms.
Finally, we note some important caveats when
interpreting our conclusions. The translation qual-
ity of Alice and Bob MT models turned out to be
similar in terms of BLEU. This situation favors
Bob, but in practice Bob is not guaranteed to be
able to create shadow models of the same stan-
dard, nor verify how well it performs compared to
the Alice model. We stress that when one is to in-
terpret the results, one must evaluate both on Bob’s
test set and Alice probes side-by-side, like those
shown in Tables 2, 3, and 7, to account for the fact
that Bob’s attack on his own shadow model trans-
lations is likely an optimistic upper-bound on the
real attack accuracy on Alice’s model.
We believe our dataset and analysis is a good
starting point for research in these privacy ques-
tions. While we focused on MT, the formulation
is applicable to other kinds of sequence generation
models such as text summarization and video cap-
tioning; these will be interesting as future work.
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